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Abstract
National science and technology policy is concerned with societal
choices with respect to the rate and directions of technological change
and the adoption and use of new technology in society. Such policy
choices occur primarily- in connection with management of the creation,
dissemination, and use ^rf scientific and technical information. Two
categories of policy instruments are discussed: (1) market-oriented
approaches; and (2) direct public action. This paper is primarily
concerned with pointing out possibilities for increased use of market-
oriented approaches that can provide benefits to society in the form
of an increased rate of innovation and of more "appropriate" technology,
better suited to the needs of consumers.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
National science and technology policy is concerned with societal
choices with respect to technological change and the adoption and use
of new technology in society, The creation of new technology can be
viewed as the creation of new knowledge or information through research
and invention. Invention and research, in turn, draw on previous work,
and a society's policies with respect to the storage, retrieval, and
dissemination of scientific and technical information are important
elements of national science and technology policy. The adoption and
use of new technology in society can be influenced in many ways by
government policies and actions that deal with questions of access to
or the provision of information concerning the new technology to users.
This paper is concerned with all three stages of the information
production-consumption process in the science and technology field:
creation, dissemination, and use.
A government agency, such as NASA, is involved with all three stages
of the information production and consumption process in its own field
of space science and technology. It creates new information through its
research and development programs. It disseminates this information and
assists nonaerospace firms and various government agencies in making use
of this information through its technology transfer program. And NASA
is also, of course, a user of both NASA-created and other information
in its own research and development programs. A private sector firm is
also typically involved in all stages of this process in its own field
of activity.
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The objectives of national science and technology policy have
traditionally been thought of in terms of increasing economic effi-
ciency, productivity, and GNP. These overall national economic objec-
tives can each be affected by changes in policy with respect to crea-
tion, dissemination, and use of scientific and technological informs-
tion, and a number of these connections will be discussed here.
Efficiency, productivity, and GNP are all quantities that are
independent of what is being produced. By focusing on these economic
measures it is implicitly assumed that the national output is produced
in properly functioning markets, in which the goods and services that
are preferred by consumers are being provided. Of course, only a por-
tion of the national output is produced in properly functioning markets
in the U.S. or any other country. If only a small fraction of the GNP
is produced outside of properly functioning markets, the effects of
ignoring the nonmarket sectors in developing science and technology
policy may not be serious. However, the U.S. economy has become a non-
market economy in many of its major sectors, and it is doubtful if these
sectors can be ignored in future planning. Several types of deviations
from a free market exist, and some of their implications for science
and technology policy will be discussed. Those deviations of special
interest here are: (1) monopoly; (2) government regulation; (3) govern-
ment provision of services; and (4) the fact that the principal costs
of provision of services are being incurred by users rather than pro-
viders. As a result of these deviations from a free market, the
validity of focusing primarily on productivity and GNP when seeking to
formulate national science and technology policy becomes doubtful. An
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attempt is made here to suggest some more relevant measures of economic
performance, but these suggestions can only be viewed as preliminary
at this stage.
The growth rate of productivity has been decreasing in the 1970's
in the U.S., while this quantity, along with the real GNP, has contin-
ued to increase in Japan, West Germany, and some other nations (ll.
Economic (GNP) growth.in the U.S. has been primarily a result of an
increase in productivity and only in small measure a result of capital
investment (2), (3). T * factors that influence productivity are
therefore of considerable interest. The entire subject is confused
by the use of noncomparable measures and by the aggregation of sectors
of the economy, such as manufacturing and services, that may have widely
different rates of change of productivity. However, in the period
1900-1960 steady productivity increases in both m ittfacturing and agri-
culture occurred. Denison has put forward the hypothesis that, since
schooling increased in the U.S. during these years of productivity
increase, schooling was responsible for the increase (4). A more per-
suasive argument put forward by Klein is that productivity increased
as a result of innovation in dynamically changing competitive U.S.
markets (5). Klein's argument is that the U.S. market is now less
competitive and that, since firms feel less pressure to innovate,
there is less innovation and consequently a reduced rate of increase
in productivity. Causes of the decline in competitive markets can
be found in the increased roles in the economy of industries subject
to regulation, industries with highly concentrated market structures,
and governmental provision of services.
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In addition, it has been widely observed that the U.S. is now
an "information economy," in the sense that more than half of our
paid workers and our economy is now engaged in the production of
information-related products or services (61, (7), (8). Information
is not like other economic goody , because new ideas can be copied,
usually at a much lower cost than the cost of creation. Therefore,
the cost of creation of a new idea, through investment in basic
research, for example, may not be appropriable, and potential investors
will tend to underinvest in basic research for this reason. When we
speak of underinvestment in this connection, we mean, relative to the
amount of investment that would be socially optimal. Society receives
benefits that go beyond the benefits received by the consumers of edu-
cation and the firms that do basic research. It is therefore is
society's interest to intervene in the markets for innovation, informa-
tion creation, and education through government subsidies or by creating
incentives for enhanced investment in these activities in the private
sector. Various governmental actions have been taken to make investment
in innovation more attractive, including patent, copyright, and tax in-
centives. Direct public support of basic research and education is also
a traditional part of national science and technolo 6y
 policy. It in
not at all clear that reliance on these traditional policies will be
the most effective national policy in the years to come.
Perhaps the most significant deviation from a market economy in
the U.S. is a result of the existence of the "household economy" in
which the final output of the market economy is combined with user
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time to produce the services that users ultimately consume (9), (101.
The existence of the household economy is not a form of market failure,
but its existence raises a question, familiar in system analysis, of
possible suboptimization through a focus on the market economy portion
of the total system, rather than on the total system which includes
both the market economy and the household economy. If the household
economy were small in comparison with the market economy, a policy focus
on the market economy might be justified. However, in the U.S., the
household economy is comparable to the size of the market economy (9).
Therefore, it may turn out to be very 'important to consider the effects
of science and technology policy on the household economy along with
its effects on the market economy.
2.0 THE PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INFORMATION
The information production-consumption process can be thought of
as beginning with the creation of new information and proceeding through
a dissemination process to the user who then consumes the information
or uses-it,  possibly in creating a further innovation. An innovation
that is brought to the market often includes both a new technology and
a new concept of how this new technology can be utilized. Innovations
often create new information that is disseminated and incorporated
in other new products or services, etc.
There are three main policy instruments that have been used to
encourage individuals and firms to create, disseminate, and utilize
new information: (1) patents and copyrights; (2) direct funding of
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research, development, and production by the government; and (3)
subsidizing and other facilitating private sector investment in
innovation and related activities. These policy instruments will
be discussed in the following.
2.1 Patents and Copyrights
When we think of the individual inventor or creator of a new
work of art, it is easy to see the economic effects of granting a
patent or copyright to this individual. The patented invention or
copyrighted work is protected against copying for some period of
years and is thus made more valuable and more readily sold, and this
increased value creates an incentive for further investing in Innova-
tion and invention.
There is an apparent tension between the policy objectives of
obtaining a high national level of creativity and the policy objective
of obtaining rapid dissemination of the results of the creative pro-
cess. The policy instruments, such as copyright laws, that have been
used to encourage creativity do so by creating barriers to copying
and apparently act as obstacles to rapid dissemination. However, the
tension is primarily a tension between short and long run objectives.
In the short run, an innovation can perhaps be most rapidly dissemi-
nated by allowing free access to it. But in tfie long run, it is
necessary to be concerned not only with dissemination of known ideas,
but also with the continued creation of new ideas, so there will be
something to disseminate. Patents and copyrights encourage both
innovation and the disclosure of innovation. The alternative of
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allowing free dissemination results in innovations being kept secret
as far as possible, which obviously does not promote dissemination.
Even under a property right system, many innovations, such as computer
software, are not protected, and innovators often go to considerable
lengths to keep their ideas secret 1111, [121.
The effects of patGat laws on the operation of a modern, competi-
tive industrial market can be rather different from the effects on
individual inventors. lei modern industry, the invention process has
been commercialized. Inventors are hired and organized to create new
ideas that will be most beneficial to the firms that employ them. In
some markets the innovation process has been accelerated to a very
high pace. The computer industry is an example of an industry with a
rapid development cycles typically less than 5 years for a major inno-
vation. A rapid obsolescence of products naturally accompanies this
rapid introduction of new products. Five-year,old computers may` work
very well, but their value is only a small fraction of their purchase
i
price.
An important distinction needs to be made between the invention
process that may be involved in creating anew product and the innova-
tion process that is concerned with selecting the specific character-
istics and technology of the new product and bringing it to the market-
place. Many innovations are not patentable. But innovation is protected
by trade secret law and by the time it takes to copy a new product.
In a high technology field, the time to copy may be over a year,
and a firm that is a year or two behind its competitors may find
M .
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that its competitors have written off the costs of creation by the
time its product reaches the market, so it does not gain a price
advantage through copying. In such a market, copying would not be
a successful strategy. The role of patents in such a market is
unclear. Patents on basic inventions that will be used in several
cycles of innovation have long-term value. Patents oct obsolete
products art obviously not of value. The usual argument that firms
will underinvest in innovation does not seem to apply to rapidly
changing, high technology markets. Firms in these markets must
innovate in order to aurvive. Firms can effectively nullify the
effects of patents by entering into cross-licensing agreements.
Firms, in effect, give up the potential rewards from occasional basic
patents in order to avoid the risk of competitors' inventions blocking
their access to the market. Of course, cross-licensing and patent
pools can violati the antitrust laws (13). Buk0 all new entrants
to an industry can join the licensing agreements, the effects are not
anticompetitive.
The economics of invention and innovation in markets with rapidly
changing technology appears to be an important field for research (14).
Neither the operation of such markets without government intervention
nor the effects of patents and cross-licensing agreements in such
markets are now well understood.
2.2 Direct Funding of the Creation of New Information
As an alternative to creating property rights in new information
through patents and copyrights, direct public investment can be made
R .
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in the creation of new information, In areas in which the goyernmen,t
has a mission responsibility, as in defense and space, it can be
expected to support the research that it believes will be most bene-
ficial to its missions in the long run. In areas in which the private
sector is responsible for providing products and services to consumers,
there is also a potential role for government supported research,
especially basic research. The economic argument that firms will
underinvest in research that leads to inventions subject to copying
is even more applicable to basic research that is aimed at under-
standing nature, because patents do not cover theories or laws of
nature. Thus, the discoveries that come from basic research will
benefit a firm's competitors as much as the firm itself (except for
public relations benefits), so the amount of basic research done in
the private sector will tend to be Less than is socially optimal [15),
[16). Some form of governmental intervention in the market, in-order
to create increased incentives for carrying out basic research, is
therefore appropriate. And direct government funding is a straight-
forward way to support basic research.
once government funding of research is adopted as a national
policy, a question arises with respect to the ownership of patents
and copyrights on innovations made in this research. P?resumaba,y, the
national interest is best served by a government patent policy that
will maximize innovation. Government ownership of patents results in
disclosure, but it does not create incentives for firms to make the
necessary investments to bring these patented innovations to the
market. Granting of exclusive rights to firms that do make such
Y x
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iniestments would enhance the incentives to uevelop these innovations,
much as homestead rights have been used to encourage the development
of government land.
Another important policy issue in this area is that of the
allocation of funds. What areas of research should receive funding,
and at what levels? A 'balance of many diverse interests is somehow
achieved in the present system. However, there may be opportunities
for improving the present system, for example, by creating more inde-
pendent sources of research Funding that are likely to support research
leading in new directions. hoth industry and mission-oriented agencies
could strengthen their positions in the long term by supporting basic
research projects of special interest to them, rather than relying on
others to provide this support.
2.3 Facilitating Private Sector Investment in the Creation
of New Information
Industrial investment in research can be increased through tax
incentives. However, there is the risk that the amount of new research
may be small in relation to the amount or tax embsidy, because firms
have an incentive to reclassify existing activities to quality for
favorable tax treatment as well as to initiate new research.
Also of importance is the possibility of more industry-sponsored
research, on an industry-wide basis, in universities, industrial
research labs, or research institutes. There are likely to be many
cases arising in the future in which it is important for an entire
industry tc develop a new set of techniques that will be used through-
out the industry. Projects to develop these techniques could appro-
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priately be funded and managed by the concerned industries themselves,
without governmental intervention. Industry cooperation in such
research programs could, however, have antitrust implications, and
it to possible that new legislation would be helpful in encouraging
this type of industry-wide research activity.
The principal limitation on industry-wide research is the compet-
itive nature of industrial firms and the desire by each firm for
secrecy and the exclusive use of new ideas created by an individual
firm. However, there are precedents for this sort of industry coopera-
tion in many industries. The necessary condition for a augcessful
program of this type is a guarantee of access to all outputs of the
program to all industrial participants in the program. This condition
can best be met by carrying out the research in universities or non-
profit institutions, separate to some extent from the firms. It would
be difficult to create a successful pro6r&A,  that would employ scientists
and engineers from the participating firms in the direct conduct of the
cooperative research. On the other hand, from a national policy stand-
point, a central feature of this approach would be the participation
of scientists and design and development engineers from industry in
project selection and the directions to be taken in the research done
under the program. The incentive for firms to provide this costly
participation in the management of the research program would be
stronger under an industry-financed program than a tax-supported .program.
2.4 Facilitating Private Sector Innovation
The production-use cycle can be entered at the use end rather
than-the creation end. Policy instruments can be designed to facilitate
it;
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the use of existing information in the process of bringing a
new product or service to the market, 4.e, in the innovation and
product planning process. NASA's technology transfer program is
designed to assist government agencies and industrial firms in the
nonaerospace sectors of the economy in making use of new technology
that has been created in the space program and that has promise for
utilization in other sectors of the economy.
The policy instruments used by NASA include; (1) creating
information "bulletins" or abstracts that describe the new technol-
ogies believed to have significant potential in nonaerospace applica-
tions and making these abstracts readily available to U.S. industry
and government agencies; (2) assisting nonaerospace users in the
product planning process, for example by going beyond an informat
abstract to a complete business plan for the adaptation of a NASA-
developed technology to a specific commercial application. This
latter form of technology transfer obviously requires careful project
selection, because there may be hundreds of possible products or
services that could be developed from a specific NASA technology.
However, it has the important value that it creates an example that
is specific enough to present potential users with a much more complete
picture of the possibilities than a simple description of the technology
itself. Even if the sample business plan is not adopted, it could stim-
ulate a user to create a business plan that would-be adopted. The
technology transfer process is not well understood, but it seems
reasonable that it might be economically efficient to go somewhat
beyond the basic abstract and document dissemination process.
12
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What is unclear is just how far and in what ways it is efficient
for an agency like NASA to enter into the product planning process.
A somewhat different approach to technology transfer is t:,,
provide a subsidy to firms willing to undertake product planning
and development of products that would use certain classes of tech-
nologies or that would provide products or services of certain
desired types. Both Japan and England have experimented with this
approach, using a "national research and development corporation"
as the organizational entity for carrying out this idea. Rep.
Fuqua has introduced a bill that would create a U.S. quasi-
governmental corporation to encourage the development of new products,
processes, and industries using the properties of the apace environ-
ment (17). The bill provides for the "space industrialization corpor-
ation" to provide funds to industrial ventures under negotiated man-
agement plans, with repayment including a profit being required bf
profitable ventures. This provision follows the plan of British and
Japanese corporations that have been organized in the same way with
repayment only required from profitable ventures. It also incorporates
the important concept of allowing negotiation rather than requiring
competitive bids. A sum of $50 million per year for two years is
proposed to get the corporation started. Further funding could be
voted. The Fuqua plan creates a corporation that would initially be
an agency of the federal government, but provides that it can be con-
verted into a publicly owned private corporation.
A significant advantage of this approach to technology transfer
is that it would leave the entire product planning process to industry,
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where it can be done best, and it does so in a way that protects the
confidentiality of the ideas submitted in proposals. The research and
development corporation would not be required to use the competitive
bid approach and hence would tot ba.,e to define the product or other-
wise inject itself into the produce planning process. It would only
have to select which proposals to support. If it maintained confiden-
tiality of the proposals submitted, it could expect to receive pro-
posals with the best available innovative concepts that industry could
present. The economic justification for this approach in a market
such as the indus%lrialization of space is the uncertainty of profits,
combined with very large investment per project required, in a market
that would offer long term benefits to the U.S. by maintaining the
comparative advantage the U.S. has developed in space technology and
applications. There is no reason that this approach could not be used
for "market development" programs in a wide variety of fields.
3.0 IMPROVING THE OPERA'T'ION OF MARKETS IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE
INNOVATION THAT IS RESPONSIVE TO CONSUMER DEMAND
It has become apparent in recent years that industries with a high
degree of concentration, with strong local monopolies, or with high
barriers to entry more often than not achieve their protection from
competition through government action [18]. Industries that consist
of a few large firms seem to have less incentive to innovate, if it is
difficult for small competitors to enter their market with innovative
new products. In industries where small competitors can enter the
r.
14
market rather easily, as in the computer industry, small firms
provide a very large fraction of the innovation that occurs.
Four major types of policy options are considered here that
are of interest in dealing with industries that have somehow managed
to obtain governmental protection from competition: (1) deregulation
in "regulated industries" such as railroads; (2) deregulation in
"unregulated" markets; (3) improved consumer information in all markets,
but especially in local service markets; and (4) privatization of
markets dominated by government providers of service.
3.1 Deregulation of "regulated industries"
Although government regulation is often adopted as a consumer pro-
tection measure, the eventual effect is usually to limit competition
by creating barriers to entry to the regulated market (19]. The pace of
technological change in regulated markets is slowed for a number-of
reasons. Governmental approval may be required to make new investments
of certain types, and the regulatory process can be used to prevent an
innovative firm in a regulated market from introducing new technology
as fast as it would like. Once new technology is in place, the regu-
latory process can be used to prevent pricing services that use the
technology in ways that would threaten less innovative service providers.
In addition, regulators and regulated industries may adopt pricing
strategies that minimize present prices but slow the introduction of
new technology that would reduce prices in the future. Only in markets
where competition is restrained by government action can these anti-
innovation policies be pursued and sustained for long periods of time.
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A government can, thus, through its own actions, create a competi-
tive disadvantage for its industries in world markets. Of course,
governments do not act to regulate an industry without the consent of
the industry, and usually governments are pushed into regulation by
Industry, in order to limit competition (20]. However, when new
national policies to encourage innovation are being considered, it is
difficult to think of a more significant policy option than deregula-
tion, in industries presently Subject to regulation [21].
This argument does not depend on economic studies of innovation
as a function of firm size or market structure. A number of studies
have been made of the various economic characteristics of firms, in
an attempt to identify market conditions favorable to innovation. It
has been suggested that large firms may be more apt to innovate than
small firms, because they have more flexible resources [22]. Firms in
competitive markets that are not too fragmented have been found_to be
more innovative than firms in either highly concentrated markets or
markets with a large number of very small firms [23]. However, the
rate of innovation iP also strongly a function of the specific industry
and its stage of evolution [24]. Regulation could be used to influence
firm size or market structure, but its direct effects on innovation are,
in the author's opinion, much stronger than any of the other market
characteristics that have been studied. And the evidence is that regu-
lation is consistently used to slow the pace of innovation. For example,
the rate of innovation in the business telephone terminal market was
extremely slow when this market was protected from competition. The
Carterfone decision in 1968 opened this market to competition, and
A
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there has been a high rate of innovation since that date, both by AT&T
and its new competitors [251, [26]. The opportunity exists to increase
innovation through deregulation in many other U.S. industries.
Deregulation would not only tend to benefit consumers through an
increase in the availability of new products and services, but also
through reduced prices for existing services resulting from process
innoation. Perhaps equally important in the long term would be the
improved position of the U.S. in world markets in the deregulated
industries. In many cases regulated industries in the U.S. are indus-
tries that are completely govermentally managed in other countries,
such as railroads, telephones, and broadcasting. Thus, even though
technological change in these industries has been limited by regula-
tion in the U.S., it has also been slowed in other countries by even
more constraining governmental action. Therefore, the U.S. is not yet
at a competitive disadvantage in most of these areas. And the oppor-
tunity to take or maintain the lead in these areas is still open.
As these markets are deregulated and start to admit innovation at
an increased rate, foreign equipment suppliers will be attracted to
these markets along with U.S. suppliers. Pressures will then undoubt-
edly develop to protect U.S. equipment suppliers from foreign competi-
tion. Protectionism in these markets will be more easily justified,
if foreign markets of the same types are not open to U.S. industry, as
is almost certainly going to be the case initially. In the long term,
however, international competition may cause deregulation worldwide, if
it is initiated by the U.S. and if deregulation does lead to more rapid
technological change. A more rapid rate of technological change in the
17
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U.S. and an improvement in the relative position of U.S. firms in
these industries relative to foreign firms may create pressure for
deregulation worldwide as a competitive response.
The trend toward more rapid diffusion of innovation throughout
unregulated world markets has been widely noted. Lower wage costs
in developing countries make them competitive sources of manufactured
goods, thus putting more pressure on the developed countries to
increase the pace of innovation. At the same time, the growing world
markets are making it easier to write off R&D expenses and to finance
innovation. The deregulation of U.S. regulated markets would simply
be another step in this process.
3.2 Deregulation in "unregulated" markets
Many industries that are not regulated in the sense that public
utilities are regulated are nevertheless neither competitive nor inno-
vative. Usually these industries are highly concentrated and the role
of government in these industries is often anticompetitive, even though
less obviously so than in the case of public utilities.
For example, in the drug industry the government plays a complex
role. In connection with prescription drugs, advertising of prices
and the introduction of generic drugs would obviously increase competi-
tion. The high cost of testing new drugs creates a barrier to entry by
new smaller firms. Government policies aimed at increasing competition
could encourage innovation in this industry.
The broadcasting industry plays a key role in the economy. It is
not regulated in the way that public utilities are regulated. A market
s M
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in broadcast stations exists; entry is possible through purchase of
an existing station. But government plays a central role in limiting
competition and the operation of the market in this industry [20).
For example, pay-by-program television has been technically feasible
since the late 1950's. But the introduction of pay television into
the broadcast market would create economic risks for the existing
networks and stations. Their marketa have been protected from pay
television competition up to the present time by restrictive FCC rules
and the administration of those rules, even though it makes no more
economic sense to ban pay television than it would to prevent magazines
from charging consumers for copies and allow only magazines that relied
exclusively on advertising for their revenues to exist.
There are many opportunities to increase competition and innovation
in unregulated U.S. industries, simply by withdrawing governmental support
for anticompetitive-practices in these industries. Thus, the science
and technology policy option of greatest significance in many industries
today is simply the option of repealing previous legislation. This state-
ment has many detailed implications that differ from industry to industry.
And each industry would require a major study and analysis effort, as
well as a political consensus sufficient to overcome industry opposition
to deregulation, in order to implement a deregulation policy option.




A well functioning market requires that consumers have adequate
information about price and quality. Otherwise, competition cannot
exist. Yet, in many consumer markets, the consumer not only her inad-
equate knowledge of product quality, but also has difficulty obtaining
even price information. Most advertising is not intended to provide
this type of information, but rather to inform consumers of the exis-
tence of products, sources of services and products, and to create
favorable impressions of the advertised product or service. While
Consumers Union provides comparative information of the type that con-
sumers need on nationally advertised products, very little information
is available on the local services and products that consume most of
the consumer's income: housing, medical services, auto repair service,
and other local services.
It is not reasonable to expect either government or industry to
provide the type of information that consumers need. The job will
almost certainly have to be done by consumer groups, if it is to be
done at all. Nevertheless, the opportunity exists for government to
facilitate the development of consumer information services. It is
reasonable to expect very substantial gains in the productivity of
local services, as well as a much more rapid rate of innovation in
these industries, as a result of increased competition that would
result from improved consumer information at the local level [27], [28].
3.4 Privatization
In many sectors of the economy the government acts as a monopoly
or near-monopoly provider of services. The postal service, the public
M r
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schools, public libraries, defense, and the exploration of space
are some of thn major markets dominated by government or quasi-
government providers. One of the sources of difficulty in these
markets is the fact that services are provided to users at zero
price, Funds are obtained for the provision of these services
through general taxation, and these funds are allocated to the
service provider by Congress or a state legislature. Such organi-
zations become attuned to the wishes of their legislative constitu-
ents, but their incentives to serve their users are weak and exist
only to the extent that their users make their demands felt by their
representatives in the legislature. In some cases, this system is
quite satisfactory. When the users are industri4l firms, the like-
lihood is high that the legislature will adequately represent the
interests of the user in dealings with the government service provider.
However, when users are individuals, it is difficult for the users to
arrange for their interests to be adequately represented. A policy
option that is, in principle, easy to adopt is to charge users directly
for the service, rather than to use tax funds to pay for the service.
The principal benefit of this approach is that service providers become
more attentive to their cuabimers. However, this approach does not
benefit users to the full extent possible unless users have an alterna-
tive supplier to turn to. Thus, the postal service feels some pressure
from the threat that users will reduce their purchases of service, but
the pressure is much greater, if users can get their packages or messages
delivered by an alternative service provider such as United Parcel Service.
Thus, the combination of funding through direct user payments with opening
1
21
the market to competitors avoids the principal difficulties with
government provision of-service. But there is still one difficulty
with such a market, and that is the fact that both government and
private sector monopoly service providers tend not to price their
services in proportion to cost. In other words, they subsidize one
service from revenues obtained from another service. Such cross-
subsidies are often introduced in response to their legislative con-
stituents [291• Once in existence, such cross-subsidies are politi-
cally difficult to eliminate, and their existence can block the adop-
tion of open entry policies that threaten to force the market toward
cost-based pricing. An example is the subsidy of rural mail delivery
by urban mail. The only satisfactory way of preserving such subsidies
is to make them into direct subsidies. However, direct subsidies are
more difficult to get political support for; their economic and social
effects are often examined more closely than are the effects of `indirect
subsidies. For example, should rural mail and telephone subsidies be
extri¢ded to both rich and poor rural dwellers, and, if not, how could
the distinction be made on a practical basis?
If a direct subsidy is acceptable politically, as it might be in
the case of low income users of public schools and libraries, it can
be combined with a direct user payment system by providing vouchers
to the low income users [30]. But again, such a system is only fully
effective if the user can turn to an alternate source of service if
unsatisfied. Once free entry is allowed, along with cost-based
pricing and direct user payment, the need for a government service
provider often disappears altogether. The only residual trace of
a•
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government intervention would then be the provision of vouchers or
scholarships to low income individuals. In such a case, full
"privatization" of the service can be accomplished.
In defense and space, the path to privatization is not as
straightforward as it is in the case of purely domestic services.
Nevertheless, in both defense and space in the U.S., the government
relies on the private sector for its hardware, software, and some
of its operational services, so some elements of privatization are
present in these services. The opportunity for further privatization
may exist in defense and space, and analysis of this possibility appears
to be appropriate. The directions in which innovation in these fields
Is moving is now determined by a process in which the individual con-
sumer plays almost no role whatsoever. It is not easy to bring the
consumer into these fields effectively. A token, uninformed consumer
on an advisory board is not an effective mechanism for getting consumer
"input." One possibility that has not been adequately explored is the
idea of improving consumer-oriented information about the operation
and significance of these agencies. Of course # both agencies now
spend substantial sums on providing information to consumers, but
this information is organized and presented in a way that is likely
to strengthen public support for existing programs. The new possibility
is to provide information that will cause consumers to question the
basic premises and orientation of existing programs and to see some of
the options for defense and space.that are not now given official support.
It is quite possible that a more open, questioning approach to defense
and space policy would result in more innovation and more effective
programs in the long term.
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4.0 IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT OF GOVERNMENT SPONSORED
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
The market concepts discussed in previous sections have some
bearing on the questions of the appropriateness of government
sponsorship of R&D and of how project selection in government spon-
.
cored R&D should be carried out.
Starting with basic research, there seems to be little contro-
versy over the appropriateness of some form of governmental stimulus
to this activity, whether through direct support, patent and copyright
protection, or tax incentives. The project selection mechanism is
now fairly diverse, and there are many reasons for favoring a diversity-
oriented approach to funding and project selection. The economic con-
cept that is relevant here is that the customers or users of basic
research should be involved in project selection and funding, by analogy
to the role of the consumer in markets. This concept is only occasion-
ally operative today. A possible example of the application of this
principle would be to bring product development engineers into the pro-
ject selection process in the support of research projects in their
field at an agency like NSF. This group now influences, to some extent,
the paths of basic research within their own companies. It might be
feasible to increase their influence in government sponsored programs
as well, on the basis that they are the most direct consumers of basic
research. The ordinary individual is the ultimate consumer of basic
research, and again the only realistic opportunity for increasing
consumer participation appears to be through improved consumer informa-
tion on the basic research establishment and its operation.
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Considering next the role of government in relation to applied
research and development, the appropriate role is fairly clear in
areas in which the government has a mission responsibility and
monopoly, such as defense and space. In these areas the government
is responsible for funding, project selection, and overall management.
The possibility of increasing the degree of privatization and through
this, competition and innovation, was discussed above. In civilian
markets, there may also be a role for government sponsored applied
research and development, but the case is less clear. If there is an
appropriate role for government sponsored R&D in civilian markets, it
is probably primarily in applied research, because product development
is closely tied to the market and is beat done by firms that are
familiar with the market [31].
Applied research is research that is oriented toward specific
applications in specific markets. It is often clear that a specific
type of device or technique is of key importance in the evolution of
a particular field, and it is clear that the best way to promote pro-
gress in this field is through the development of specific devices or
examples of the critical technique. In such cases this development
is not coupled directly to the market, but rather represents learning
work that goes beyond basic research and prepares the way for market-
oriented development to follow. An example might be a key component
in a large system, such as a new type of communication satellite that
would make possible an improved communication system. In such cases,
there may well be a case for government sponsorship of rM on the
is.
economic grounds that the private sector tends to underinvest in this
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type of work, because it is unable to appropriate the results. A
firm is likely to underinvest in applied research that could benefit
its competitors as much as itself; it will prefer to wait until
there is a specific market opportunity to focus its work on. Thus,
if the government can find these critical areas of applied research,
it can probably make an important contribution to the national com-
petitive position in whatever industries it chooses to support.
The process by which areas of government applied research are
chosen is thus an important element of the R&D program. It may be
that there are opportunities for organizational improvments in the
project selection process. At the present time, U.S. government
agencies have advisory panels that help them to keep in touch with
the industry and its views. A possible opportunity for improvement
might lie in the way industry representatives are chosen for these
panels or in the ways that panel members are able to express their
views. In some cases an industry panelist may know of an area that
would be productive for government R&D, but may be reluctant to share
his ideas with his competitors. There may be an organizational alter-
native that would allow secrecy to be maintained. For example, if
the R&D is government sponsored but done in industry, a negotiated
contract rather than a competitive procurement could protect the ideas
of the industry R&D group. Of course, this approach would violate
many of the existing constraints on government contracting. An alter-
native to this approach is the creation of tax incentives for R&D,
under which firms would make project selections completely on their




support of a great deal of work that industry defines as R n for tax
purposes, but that may be nothing more than restyling, as in the
automobile industry.
One way of looking at government R&D in civilian markets is that
the government is acting as an industry-wide cooperative R&D agency.
A portion of the industry's corporate income tax can be thought of as
being allocated to this purpose, and it is therefore reasonable to
expect R&D project selection to be made by industry. In order to avoid
the weaknesses of both government sponsored R&D and the tax incentive
approach, it might be possible to encourage the development of industry-
wide R&D activities outside of government, as discussed in Section 2.3.
The "national research and development corporation" concept discussed
in Section 2.4 is another option that allows greater confidentiality
than a government sponsored program with consequent increased flexibility
and potential for innovation.
1
5.0 INCREASING "APPROPRIATE" INNOVATION IN
LARGE-SCALE SYSTEMS
Starting with Jacques Ellul [32],.there has 'veer. a steady flow of
literature concerned with the uncontrolled, apparently autonomous evolu-
tion of technology in directions that are "inappropriate" because they
are not directions that benefit consumers [33], [34]. The principal
contribution of economic theory to this question is to suggest that these
"inappropriate" evolutionary trends in technology are most likely to
occur in sectors of the economy in which market forces are ineffective,
often as a result of governmental action. For example, the choice of new
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technology in U.S. hospitals is not limited by considerations of economic
efficiency, because insurance payment systems cover all costs and there
is no effective competition in this market. The result has been an
extraordinary rise in hospital costs (35).
System analysis can contribute to an understanding of these trends
by pointing to examples of inappropriate technology in areas in which
large-scale societal systems are being built with inadequate coordination
and planning, such that "suboptimization" is taking place. The subsystems
of these inappropriate systems are being optimized, but no one is looking
after the overall system optimization. For example, in attempts to
increase productivity in post-secondary education, televised classes have
been used to increase the number of students per teacher. Television and
other educational technologies such as audio cassettes used in combina-
tion with still visuals have been found to have no significant difference
from each other and from live classes in. their effects on student per-
formance. When optimization of the school's operation through minimiza-
tion of teaching costs is done, television appears to be the preferred
technology. However, if optimization of the entire learning operation,
including the cost of student time, is done, technologies such as audio
or video cassettes that offer students the chance to listen to lectures
when they wish and to review them as often as they wish, result in lower
total costs. The optimization of the school's productivity is a subop-
timization, because it fails to include the students in the system and
the costs of student time that would be included in an overall system
optimization. The system boundary in such a case has been incorrectly
drawn, from the standpoint of society, even though correctly drawn from
the standpoint of the school.
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A similar suboptimization is taking place in some areas of natdonal
science and technology policy. Present policy focuses on productivity
in the market economy and on GNP, the output of the market economy
rather than on the output of the total economy. The total economy
includes both the market economy and the household economy. In the U.S.,
the household economy is comparable to the size of the market economy,
because for most services that consumers receive, the cost of consumer
time is several times as large as the price that users pay into the
market economy for goods and services [9], [10]. As in the case of
educational technology, there is a danger that firms will choose the
best technology from their standpoint and end up with the wrong technology
from society's standpoint. Wrong choices by firms will be corrected in
markets where users have a chance to obtain services from more than one
provider. However, in fields such as education, medical care, defense,
and space, where there are local or national monopolies, wrong choices
are not automatically corrected.
One approach to science and technology policy that would improve
technological choices in large-scale systems is, of course, to improve
the operation of markets by increasing competition and consumer choice,
as discussed in Section 3. When deregulation and competition are not
feasible, it still may be possible to refocus technological choice toward
options that will minimize total cost rather than provider cost and that
will optimize total system operation rather than the subsystem under the
control of the provider. Any new non-market approach to science and
technology policy that seeks to induce overall'system optimization will
probably have to do so by facilitating large-scale system planning that
does in fact take users into account in the organizational design.
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For example, there are many opportunities for innovation in such
areas as city design, in the organizational sense rather than the
physical sense. In principle, such local service markets as housing,
transportation, education, and policy services could be highly innovative.
Yhese markets are presently highly constrained by regulation and most are
monopolistic. Both market incentive approaches, such as deregulation and
privatization, and new organization designs that encourage overall system
optimization could usefully be the subject of analysis and R&D.
5.0 CONCLUSIONS
Science and technology policy is concerned with the rate and direc-
tions of technolcgical change in society. Two broad categories of policy
instruments are available: (1) market-oriented approaches, such as the
modification of property rights in newly created information through
patent law, that seek to increase the incentives for the private sector
to invest in R&D; (2) direct public action, such as government sponsor-
ship of R&D, that seeks to substitute government action for the operation
of the market. Much existing policy makes use of the direct action
approach. This paper has been primarily concerned with pointing out
possibilities for the use of market-oriented approaches and some of the
advantages of such approaches that can be seen from basic economic
principles.
The fundamental economic justification for government action to
increase innovation in markets is that the private sector will tend to
underinvest in R&D because it is not able to fully appropriate the bene-
fits of such investments. The reason for this inappropriability is that
the information that results from R&D can be copied by competitors and
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the originating firm may, therefore, not be able to recover its costs of
creation. In markets that are competitive and in which the industry is
at a stage where technology is changing rapidly, investing in R&D is a
necessary element for the survival of a producing firm. Innovations in
such markets are protected by the fact that it takes a substantial time
and effort for competitors to make copies. It is unlikely that firms
underinvest in R&D in these markets, and further stimulus to innovation
through governmental action is not needed.
In regulated markets and other markets in which barriers to entry
are created by governmental action, there is often a variety of adminis-
trative obstacles to the introduction of innovation. Deregulation is the
most effective mechanism for the stimulation of innovation in these
industries.
The objectives of technological innovation for a nation are twofold:
(1) to maintain or acquire a competitive position in the world market;
(2) to provide better products and services to the citizens of the nation.
Much of national science and technology policy can be justified by its
effectiveness in contributing to the first objective. For example, the
use of tax funds in support of education, basic research, and libraries
contributes to the development of a national information infrastructure.
This infrastructure creates the basis for comparative advantage in inter-
national trade in the information-based economies of the modern world.
The mechanisms for government action in support of education, basic
research, and libraries involve subsidies of these activities. The
quality of these activities could probably be improved by giving more
control over the character of the services offered to the users rather
a r
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than the providers of these services. The organizational approach to
providing government support for industrial R&D could also probably be
improved. Industry-wide R&D organizations within the government, in
government corporations, and in private firms could provide similar
services but with different degrees of industry control and confiden-
tiality for innovative ideas.
In many large-scale systems, the evolution of technology has taken
place in watts that have been characterized as "autonomous" and "inappro-
priate," because the technologies seem to have evolved in directions of
their own, without regard for human needs. Much of the difficulty can
be traced to the fact that these systems are monopolistic; users in these
systems do not have an adequate choice. Market-incentive approaches such
as deregulation and privatization, offer the most reliable path to the
restoration of appropriate innovation. However, in certain areas, such
as defense and space, a new approach to science ,and technology policy
that seeks to achieve a more comprehensive approach to system planning
may bring innovation that is more appropriate to human needs.
A general conclusion is that there seems to be a number of opportuni-
ties for increasing the rate of innovation and for bringing the directions
of innovation more closely into line with the needs of users. Most of
these opportunities can best be realized by improving the operation of
markets by such techniques as deregulation, improving the quality of
consumer information, and privatization. A second conclusion is that
these improvements could benefit the consumer, both as a member of a
nation with a stronger position in the world market and as a consumer of
more "appropriate" technology. To obtain these benefits, various forms
R.
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of organizational innovation appear to be needed. Studies of new organi-
zational options for the implementation of national science and technology
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